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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
FIDELITY IX\rESTENT CO~I­
P .. A_XY, a Utah l~orporation, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
vs. 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, a Political 
Corporation of the State of Utah. 
Defendant and Appellant. 
Case No. 
7550 
Appellants' Brief 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
This action was tried upon an agreed Statement of 
Facts. (R-4) Plaintiff corporation is the owner of cer-
tain real property located within the limits of the de-
fendant county. The property of the plaintiff was sub-
ject to taxation for the year 1949 and the general taxes 
for that year were duly levied and assessed thereon and 
notice thereof given the plaintiff. The plaintiff failed 
to pay such taxes before delinquency and the defendant 
county duly caused to be published the delinquent list of 
properties upon which taxes for said year remain unpaid 
and plaintiff's property was duly advertised in said 
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delinquent list. On December 20, 1949, the plaintiff ten-
dered to the County Treasurer the full amount of the 
taxes upon said property together with the penalty there-
on, but the Treasurer of the defendant county rejected 
said tender and demanded that the plaintiff make pay-
ment of the sum of 25c advertising fee in addition to the 
tendered amount. During the year 1939 and at all times 
thereafter to the present time the County Treasurer of 
the defendant county has construed the statutes to re-
quire him to charge and he has charged the advertising 
fee of 25c in addition to the tax and penalty "Thether 
or not the tax was paid before sale. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
1. That the right to collect the 25c fee for publish-
ing notice on the delinquent list is properly charged by 
the defendant county by reason of the fee scheduled in 
Section 28-2-5, Utah Code Annotated, 1943. 
2. That a construction of all the applicable statutes 
permitting such a charge should be adopted as following 
the continued administrative construction of the same. 
ARGUMENT 
Point 1 
The following statutes would appear to be in con-
flict as to the right to charge au advertising fee after de-
linquency and before sale. Section 28-2-5 Utah Code 
Annotated 1943, reads in part as follows : ''The County 
Treasurer shall receive the following fees: . . . For 
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each item published in the delinquent list under the pro-
Yision of Section 80-10-28, 25 rents.'' The defendant 
county is required by la\v to so publish the delinquent list 
and thus to incur an obligation to pay for such publica-
tion. This publication is made prior to the date of sale. 
After that each delinquent property is an ''item publish-
ed.'' The reasonable construction of the aforesaid stat-
ute "Tould seem to be that the reimbursements to the 
defendant county for the cost of such publication should 
be made by charging it against the property at the rate 
of 23c for each item pursuant to the provision of the 
above quoted statute. It would seem, therefore, that the 
time when the 25c fee is payable is \vhen the defendant 
county has necessarily incurred the expense of such publi-
cation, and that the fee should ·be collected for each item 
after the publication expense has been incurred, even 
though the tax and the penalty are paid or tendered 
before the sale date. 
Apparently contrary IS that portion of Section 
80-10-28 which reads in part a.s follows: ''The County 
Treasurer must publish with such list a notice that unless 
the delinquent taxes together with the penalty are paid 
before the lOth day of January . . . the real property 
upon which such taxes .are a lien . . . will be sold for 
taxes, penalty and costs on said date.'' (Emphasis added) 
It has been stated that the general rule of law re-
quires taxing statutes to be construed favorably to the 
taxpayer, but it is also stated as a general rule that "tax 
statutes are to receive a reasonable construction with a 
vie\v of carrying out their purpose and intent" 51 A. J. 
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361 Section 309. As was said in Hart vs. Smith, 159 Ind. 
182, 64 Northeast 661, 58 L.R.A. 949, 95 Am. St. Rep. 280. 
''Taxes are burdens that must necessarily be laid and the 
government is not to be regarded as a public enemy in 
imposing them. Such la\vs should not be construed from 
the standpoint of the taxpayer alone.'' The reasonable 
construction of the aforementioned statutes would not 
allow the taxpayer who has allowed his taxes to go delin-
quent to escape the advertising fee and against his pro-
perty at any time after the advertising expense has 
necessarily been incurred. The advertising has a dual 
purpose. The first of this is to inform the taxpayer and 
all interested persons that the property is about to be sold 
so as to give the taxpayer or his successors an opportun-
ity to pay the tax before sale or during the period of re-
demption. The second purpose is or might be to inform 
the general public of the properties which have been sold 
in order that there may be bidders at the May sale after 
the period of redemption. 
The first and paramount reason for the publication 
is for the protection of the taxpayer himself. Hence, it 
would not seem unreasonable to require the taxpayer to 
bear the cost of such publication and protection after his 
default. 
Point 2 
The construction of the statute contended for by the 
appellant has been the administrative interpretation of 
the statutes in question during and at all times since 
1939. The rule has been stated in McCaughn v. Hershey 
Chocolate Company, 283, U. S. 488, 75 L. Ed. 1183, 51 
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S. Ct. 510, as follows : ''The provision has been consis-
tently enforced as construed, 'vas re-enacted by Congress 
in the 1921 Art, and remained on the statute books with-
out amendment until its repeal. Such a construction of a 
doubtful or ambiguous statute by officials charged with 
its administration will not be judicially disturbed except 
for reason of weight, which this record does not present. 
(citing cases) ''The re-enactment of the statute by 
Congress, as well as the failure to amend it in the face 
of the consistent administrative construction, is at least 
persuasive of a legislative recognition and approval of 
the statute as construed." (citing cases) 
CONCLUSION 
Appellant, therefore, believes that the decree of the 
trial court should be reversed and the cause remitted 
with directions, judgment to be entered declaring that 
the County herein had authority to collect the 25c adver-
tising fee. 
Respectfully submitted, 
EDWARD M. MORRISSEY, 
County Attorney 
ARTHUR A. ALLEN, JR., 
Chief Deputy County Attorney 
WILLIAM S. LIVINGSTON, 
Deputy County Attorney 
Attorneys for the Defendants 
a;nd the Appellants 
RECEIVED two copies of the foregoing brief this 
···············----------------··--- day of June, 1950. 
Attorney for the Plaintiff atn.d Respondent. 
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